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The politics of social protection in a 
competitive African democracy: 
Explaining social protection policy 






The Kufuor (New Patriotic Party) administration of 2000-2008 implemented 
substantial reforms of the contributory social insurance system (including the 
introduction of a national health insurance scheme and a new ‘three tier’ 
pensions system), and introduced a range of social assistance schemes targeted 
at the ‘extreme poor’. This paper analyses the factors that drove policy reform 
and the broad cross-party consensus that emerged despite highly competitive 
elections. Electoral dynamics played a significant role, and this is reflected in 
the political ‘messaging’ and ‘branding’ of parties and candidates during 
election campaigns, although there is little evidence of the political salience of 
social protection. Other important factors include a complex set of ‘agendas’ 
from actors including domestic bureaucrats, international agencies and donors, 
as well as politicians. These interacted in complex ways with elite alignments 
that have favoured or worked against pro-poor policy reform at various stages. 
The paper draws on studies of election campaigns and political parties, 





This paper examines the political dynamics in Ghana’s ‘Fourth Republic’ that 
help to explain the path of social protection policy reform, and social policy 
more broadly since 2000. Significant reforms to the contributory social 
insurance system and limited social assistance schemes were introduced during 
the presidency of John A. Kufuor of the New Patriotic Party (2000-2008). These 
reforms continued to be implemented, together with modest expansion of social 
assistance, under the Mills and Mahama National Democratic Convention 
governments (2008 onwards). Social protection policy in Ghana is characterised 
by remarkable cross-party consensus within the political elite, as well as a 
relatively high degree of bureaucratic autonomy. The striking characteristics of 
social protection policy reform in Ghana include an unusual (for Anglophone 
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Africa) emphasis on contributory social insurance; the fact that the most 
significant expansion of social protection took place under a ‘right of centre’ 
government; and the apparent consensus on both the need for and shape of 
Ghana’s social protection system (such that neither party has opted to embrace 
substantial expansion of social assistance as a populist electoral tactic). This 
paper situates the emergence of this consensus and the shape of Ghana’s reform 
path within the political dynamics of Ghana’s ‘Fourth Republic’. These include 
electoral incentives – from the point of view of voting behaviour as well as the 
ways in which parties and candidates have attempted to ‘brand’ themselves with 
respect to social policy; public opinion on and the political salience of social 
policy; a range of ‘agendas’ pursued by political actors (including the 
‘ideological’ and ‘political’ agendas of party and political elites and a 
‘technocratic’ agenda pursued by bureaucrats and international agencies); and 
the agenda-setting power of various actors. 
 
After near-continuous military rule in the decades after the first military 
coup d’ etat against independence leader Kwame Nkrumah’s leftist government 
in 1966, Ghana re-democratised in 1992. A new Constitution was promulgated, 
which allowed for a Presidential system and constituency-based multiparty 
parliamentary elections. Ghana’s democratisation is complicated by the fact that 
the successful presidential candidate in the 1992 elections – Jerry Rawlings – 
had been the head of the authoritarian Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC) regime, which had ruled for more than a decade. Election-related 
violence, claims of election-rigging and of bias in the state-owned media’s 
coverage of campaigns (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994; Agyeman-Duah, 2000; Temin & 
Smith, 2002) were not uncommon. Further, the PNDC’s political party 
successor, the National Democratic Convention (NDC) enjoyed limited 
legitimacy during the first parliamentary term, after a boycott of the 
parliamentary elections by the main opposition party, the New Patriotic Party 
(NPP). Rawlings and the NDC emerged victorious again in 1996, but NPP’s 
John Kufuor won a run-off presidential election against the NDC’s candidate 
(and Rawlings’s Vice President, John Atta Mills) in 2000 and the NPP secured 
exactly half of parliamentary seats. Kufuor was re-elected in 2004, but in 2008 
the NDC returned to power with a small majority of seats and Mills winning the 
presidential election. Mills died in office in 2012, and his Vice President (John 
Mahama) was elected president in the same year, with the NDC retaining a 
parliamentary majority. These six relatively peaceful elections, largely judged 
‘free and fair’ and, in particular, two peaceful handovers of power through the 
ballot box have cemented Ghana’s reputation as a rapidly consolidating 
democracy and as the ‘Golden Child of West Africa’ (Gyimah-Boadi & 




The paper starts with a brief outline of the major social protection policy 
reforms undertaken since 2000. These reforms are described in detail in a 
separate, companion paper (Grebe, 2015). It then reviews a range of potential 
aspects of Ghanaian political dynamics that may help to explain the particular 
character of these reforms, and the broad elite consensus on social protection 
policy. First, electoral dynamics – including voter behaviour and political 
branding – during the critical elections of 2000, 2004, and 2008 – are reviewed, 
together with public opinion data on the salience of social protection. Particular 
attention is paid to the role of social protection in the election campaigns of 
2004 (when the NPP retained power after introducing several reforms) and 
2008, when the NDC managed to regain power. Specific questions include 
whether social protection was a sufficiently salient electoral issue to help 
explain policy choices, and whether parties’ electoral campaigns reveal attempts 
to differentiate themselves on the basis of social policy and whether this may 
have significantly influenced electoral outcomes. 
 
Second, the roles of various actors, including political leaders (both in 
government and the parliamentary opposition), bureaucrats, and transnational 
actors (bilateral donors and multilateral development agencies such as the World 
Bank) are reviewed. For this purpose, and following Devereux and White 
(2010), distinct ‘technocratic’, ‘ideological’, and ‘political’ agendas can 
identified and their interplay examined. Finally, the role of elite configurations 
(‘ruling coalitions’) and the nature of what is widely termed the ‘political 
settlement’ in Ghana’s ‘Fourth Republic’ is examined in an attempt to pull 
together the various strands of the analysis. In the conclusion the explanatory 
power of the various approaches is assessed, questions for further research 
raised, and some speculative reflections on the implications of Ghanaian 
political dynamics for the future direction of social protection policy offered. 
 
 
2. Background: Contributory social insurance 
reform and the introduction of limited social 
assistance in Ghana’s ‘Fourth Republic’ 
 
During the Kufuor (NPP) administration’s term, a range of social protection 
reforms were introduced. Most significantly, substantial reform of contributory 
social security was undertaken, with the introduction of a national health 
insurance scheme and major reforms to the pension system. Additionally, a 
range of social assistance measures were introduced, including the introduction 
of free primary education (school fee exemption via the ‘capitation grant’) in 
2004, a school feeding programme (the Ghana School Feeding Programme or 
GSFP) in 2005, and a cash transfer scheme known as the Livelihood 
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Empowerment Against Poverty scheme announced in 2007 and implemented 
from 2008 as the ‘flagship programme’ of a National Social Protection Strategy 
(MMYE, 2007). It also established the National Youth Employment 
Programme, and active labour market policy intended to contribute to skills and 
job creation among the youth in 2006. The period of NPP rule (2000-2008) can 
therefore be characterised as one of intense reform of contributory social 
insurance and modest expansion of social assistance. After 2008, the NDC 
government has largely continued with the implementation of reforms initiated 
under the NPP, modestly expanded the cash transfer scheme and introduced a 
number of additional programmes, including the Ghana Social Opportunities 
Project, which includes a substantial Labour-Intensive Public Works (LIPW) 
component (largely funded by a US$88 million World Bank-grant). 
 
Before 2000, the only major postcolonial reform to the pension system was the 
creation of a range of provident funds from the 1960s onwards, and their 
conversion in 1992 into a single defined-benefit scheme, known as ‘national 
basic social insurance’ under the management of the Social Security National 
Insurance Trust (SSNIT), a statutory body. The creation of SSNIT (and the 
closure of the unfunded ‘Cap 30’ pension scheme for civil servants – dating 
from the colonial era – to new entrants) converted hitherto popular provident 
funds (that provided lump sum payments upon retirement) to a pension scheme 
that would guarantee a monthly income. This conversion took place under trade 
union pressure, owing to high inflation and repeated currency devaluations (as 
part of the IMF-sponsored structural adjustment reforms undertaken by the 
Rawlings regime from 1983) which eroded the value of lump sum payments 
(Kpessa, 2011: 96). Despite the substantial growth in SSNIT membership 
between 1992 and the early 2000s, the scheme was seen as suboptimal, and the 
Kufuor administration endeavoured to reform the system so as to create a more 
comprehensive retirement income security package.1 Following a long process 
of consultation, including the appointment of the Presidential Commission 
which reported its findings in 2006, a new National Pensions Act was passed in 
2008, shortly before the NDC’s return to power. The Act provided for two 
additional ‘tiers’ in the statutory pension system, including a mandatory 
privately-administered tier and a voluntary third tier (aimed primarily at 
attracting informal sector workers) which constituted a set of individual 
accounts-based defined-contribution schemes. Implementation of these reforms, 
including the creation of a regulatory body (the National Pensions Regulatory 
Authority) to oversee private sector fund managers and trustees took place under 
the NDC government after 2008. 
 
                                         
1 Interview, Dr Anthony Akoto Osei, 5 November 2014. 
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The introduction of the National Health Insurance Scheme in 2003 was the 
realisation of an election promise that formed an important part of the NPP’s 
platform in the 2000 elections (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008). Its aim was to 
replace the ‘cash and carry’ healthcare system (in which public health facilities 
charged patients after the introduction of user charges during structural 
adjustment in the 1980s) with a system in which both public and private 
healthcare providers would provide service free of charges at the point of 
delivery to the insured. Technically it constituted an amalgam of three kinds of 
schemes, including ‘district-wide mutual health schemes’, which were later 
centralised under the NHIS. Regulations provided for premium exemption to the 
‘core poor’ (or destitute) and children whose parents were paying members, as 
well as a progressive scale of premiums and exemptions for SSNIT contributors 
and pensioners. Premium exemption was extended to all pregnant mothers and 
all children under 18 in 2008. While the original target was to reach full 
population coverage within five years, by 2013 only about a third of the 
population were classed as ‘active members’ – i.e. with a current registration 
card and ‘paid up’ if not premium-exempt (see Grebe, 2015).  
 
While not technically social assistance education-focused reforms, most notably 
the introduction of free primary education through the capitation grant in 2004 
and the launch of the Ghana School Feeding Programme (aimed both at 
reducing hunger and improving primary school enrolment rates) in 2005, are 
seen by Ghanaian policy-makers as an integral part of the country’s ‘social 
protection package.’ The capitation grant, which amounts to school fee 
abolition, has resulted in substantial rises in enrolment rates (Akyeampong et al., 
2007), but a decline in the quality of education and substantial fund ‘leakages’ 
(Ampratwum and Armah-Attoh, 2010; Ampratwum, Armah-Attoh and Ashon, 
2012). Initially launched in a small number of schools, GSFP would eventually 
reach about 1.7 children in 2013. 
 
The LEAP programme – much-vaunted as a domestically-driven cash transfer 
schemes – is a conditional cash transfer scheme, launched as the ‘flagship 
programme’ of the NSPS in 2007, with pilot implementation starting in 2008. Its 
design is based on district-level, village-level, and household-level targeting, 
with the former two selected based on poverty rankings, and the latter making 
use of community targeting and centralised proxy means-testing to verify 
eligibility. Eligibility criteria include the household being classified as 
‘extremely poor’ and the presence of at least one household member falling into 
one of the eligible categories of vulnerable persons (those over 65, the ‘severely 
disabled’, or orphans and vulnerable children). Conditions include young 
children being in primary school, enrolment in the NHIS and regular health 
facility visits. Benefit levels were initially extremely low (ranging from US$2 
and US$3.90 per household), but tripled in 2012, and the number of 
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beneficiaries enrolled in the programme grew very slowly to reach 
approximately 70,000 households in late 2013 (Handa et al., 2014). 
 
While it is significant that a cash transfer scheme was initiated by the 
Government of Ghana itself,2 benefit levels, numbers of beneficiaries, and total 
expenditure remained very low both under NPP and NDC governments. More 
significant expenditure aimed at reaching MDG goals on primary school 
enrolment and eliminating extreme hunger show a willingness throughout the 
political elite to make pro-poor resource allocations, but social assistance has 
been highly parsimonious. It is also notable that the major structural and 
parametric reforms to social protection was to contributory social insurance 
(although the NHIS has a large and growing social assistance component 
through premium exemption), suggesting a dominant development discourse 
emphasising self-reliance, productivity, and ‘growing out of poverty’ (see 
Grebe, 2015). It is notable that social security reform has mainly benefited the 
urban middle class and those in formal employment, while the modest expansion 
of social assistance and active labour market policy has largely benefitted the 
rural poor. The urban poor have largely been left out of these benefits – despite 
the attempts at covering ‘informal sector’ workers under the new pensions and 
health insurance schemes. This constitutes somewhat of a puzzle in the light of 
research on voting behaviour in African democracies, such as that of Resnick 




3. Electoral politics and public opinion 
 
It is difficult, on the basis of the evidence gathered during the course of the 
fieldwork for this study, to come to strong conclusions about the potential 
impact of electoral dynamics on welfare reform policy choices in Ghana. 
Politicians generally deny in interviews that electoral matters influenced their 
decisions (a highly questionable claim) and tend to emphasise (1) their 
ideological commitment to a chosen policy path and/or (2) the technical 
appropriateness or ‘correctness’ of the policy given the circumstances.  
 
General structural forces, mainly based on secondary literature, are discussed in 
the first subsection in order to shed light on the electoral incentives that policy-
makers faced at various stages in the reform process. What is most distinctive 
about Ghana is the highly-competitive two party system. It therefore appears 
highly likely that political leaders – at various levels of the political system – 
would have faced substantial incentives to adopt and implement policies that 
                                         
2 Interview, Akusua Frema Osei-Opare, 31 October 2014. 
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they believed either would resonate with their core supporters or would be likely 
to sway swing voters in their direction. Two puzzles present themselves when an 
electoral incentives perspective is adopted: (1) why has neither major party 
seized the populist initiative and campaigned on a platform of substantial 
expansion of social assistance? And (2) why have the urban poor largely been 
excluded from social protection policy reform? Further, the broad cross-party 
consensus around key policy choices in Ghana’s social protection reforms needs 
to be explained. 
 
In the second subsection, the analysis of electoral politics is developed by 
paying attention to how public opinion may have shaped candidates and parties’ 
assessments of which policies may resonate with the electorate. The third 
subsection provides a brief analysis of election campaign strategy and ‘political 
branding’ – i.e. how candidates and parties positioned themselves in order to 
attract support. 
 
In the next section, the focus is turned to the impact of ‘technocratic agendas’ 
and ‘ideological agendas’ (as distinct from ‘political agendas’ which largely 
refer to electoral responses and other structural incentives). This necessitates 
attention to the role of a relatively autonomous bureaucracy (an autonomy that 
may well be, at least in part, a function of the multiple transitions of power and 
competitive democracy). The key point here is that policy-making is a complex 
process involving a diverse array of actors with divergent agendas, subject to 
different incentives. But none of these actors are automatons simply responding 
to incentives: ideas matter and agency matters. Brief reflections are offered on 
the implications of the composition of elites, and elite alignments (coalitions) in 
Ghanaian politics, or what is referred to in the literature as Ghana’s ‘political 
settlement’. This perspective may help to make sense of some of the 




3.1 Electoral incentives and voting behaviour 
 
Ghana transitioned to multiparty democracy with the founding election of the 
‘Fourth Republic’ under a new constitution in 1992, when former military ruler 
Jerry Rawlings won the election under the banner of the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC), the civilian political party incarnation of the ruling PNDC. 
Rawlings emerged victorious in both the 1992 and 1996 elections, but his 
successor NDC candidate lost to the opposition New Patriotic Party presidential 
candidate, John Kufuor in 2000, who was re-elected in 2004. In the 2008 general 
election, power reverted to the NDC, with their candidate John Atta Mills 
elected president in a close contest and his vice president, who succeeded Mills 
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upon his death in 2012, re-elected in December 2012.3 Ghana’s ‘Fourth 
Republic’ has therefore performed well, with six elections and two handovers of 
power. It has also, unusually, emerged with a stable two-party alignment 
characterised by highly competitive elections, a majority of ‘core voters’ (i.e. 
stable allegiance to one of the major parties), but a substantial minority of 
‘swing voters’ who exhibit, according to Lindberg and Morrison (2005: 566) 
‘mature voting behaviour’ in switching their support based on candidates’ 
performance and policy issues. Other analyses of voter behaviour have, 
however, emphasised different aspects of voter behaviour, with Nugent (1999) 
finding strong ethnic and rural/urban themes prevailing in the 1992 and 1996 
elections and Bossuroy (2011) finding a strong relationship between ethnicity 
and voting patterns.  
 
The NDC describes itself as a social democratic party and tends to engage in 
populist rhetoric, while the NPP is generally seen as centre-right.4 The NPP’s 
origins can be traced to the conservative United Gold Coast Convention party of 
the 1940s (described by Morrison, 2004, as representing the local merchant and 
professional class and as part of a 'liberal-mercantilist' axis), the Northern 
People’s Party of the 1950s, and the United Party, which was the main 
opposition to Kwame Nkrumah’s socialist Convention People’s Party from 
independence until Ghana became a one-party state in 1964. It is therefore the 
most recent incarnation of one of the two ‘great political traditions’ of Ghana.5 
These are the Nkrumahists, on the one hand, and the Busia/Danquah tradition on 
the other – both of whom, according to Nugent, considered themselves Ghana’s 
natural rulers: 
 
‘Time and again, a return to multi-party politics has been accompanied 
by the regrouping of politicians around one of two poles, represented 
by the Nkrumah and Busia/Danquah traditions, respectively. …it is 
                                         
3 The party whose candidate won the Presidential election also gained a simple majority in the 
Parliamentary elections accompanying each Presidential poll, except for the 1992 election, in 
which the NPP withdrew from the parliamentary elections after refusing to accept the results 
of the presidential election. Like the Presidential elections, Parliamentary elections have been 
highly competitive, with the opposition NDC controlling 92 seats to the NPP’s 100 in the 
2000 election, 94 to 128 (after an increase in the size of Parliament) in 2004, and 116 to 107 
when an NDC President returned to power in 2008. 
4 This is the way in which the parties were described by most informants, including senior 
politicians in the parties themselves. It is also evident from the rhetoric employed in election 
campaigns, although there are no dramatic differences between the parties on either economic 
policy or social policy (see, for example, Nugent, 2001; Morrison, 2004; Lindberg and 
Morrison, 2005). 
5 In fact, John Kufuor himself had served as a junior minister in the Busia government 
(Interview, John A. Kufuor, 6 November 2014). 
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worth noting that even military rulers found it expedient to identify 
with one political tradition or the other. 
… 
Not surprisingly, when the PNDC hinted that there would be a return 
to constitutional government in the early 1990s, the pattern repeated 
itself. The leaders of the Busia/Danquah tradition now rediscovered 
the unity that had been lacking in 1979 [when a brief return to civilian 
rule saw the election victory of the Nkrumahist Convention People’s 
Party under Hilla Limann], and founded the New Patriotic Party to 
contest the 1992 elections. By contrast, the Nkrumahists found 
themselves split four ways’ (Nugent, 1999: 287). 
 
While not Nkrumahist itself, and despite overseeing a decade of structural 
adjustment reforms, the NDC’s left-wing rhetoric probably allowed it to attract 
the support of a significant proportion of the divided Nkrumahist parties’ 
support base. As described earlier, it was the NPP government under John 
Kufuor’s presidency that undertook the most important welfare reforms of 
recent decades, which substantially expanded the coverage of social insurance 
and to some degree social assistance. Mills’s – and later Mahama’s – NDC 
administrations embraced the reforms introduced under the NPP, overseeing the 
implementation of most of the details of the 2008 pension reforms (such as the 
creation of the National Pensions Regulatory Authority and the additional two 
tiers of pension funds), and stuck to a national health insurance approach to 
expanding healthcare access. The NDC government further embraced and 
expanded the LEAP programme (despite some initial doubts about its 
commitment), introduced further programmes such as the World Bank-funded 
Ghana Social Opportunities Project with a large LIPW component and expanded 
the existing Agriculture Subsidy Programme in 2010, with the intention of 
reaching all farmers in the country. 
 
It therefore appears that a remarkable cross-party consensus existed on the need 
for social protection measures in Ghana, and even on the broad outlines of the 
social protection system, including a large social insurance component 
augmented by social assistance to the poorest in the form of cash transfers and 
subsidised health insurance, but with social assistance parsimonious, highly 
poverty-targeted and conditional. This begs explanation, given that welfare 
reforms, and cash transfers in particular, have tended to prove controversial in 
many African countries, with strong elite resistance to ‘handouts.’ While the 
LEAP programme was controversial upon introduction – with both politicians 
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and members of the public expressing opposition to ‘free money’ and ‘handouts’ 
(Abebrese, 2011), resistance appeared to have largely dissipated by 2014.6 
 
It might be tempting to leap to the conclusion that a competitive democracy 
creates incentives on all parties to support ‘popular’ (or even ‘populist’) 
measures like cash transfers, but this neglects both the complexity of voting 
patterns and the fact that continental patterns do not fit the map of highly 
competitive elections as neatly as one might expect. Nor does this explain why it 
was the right-of-centre NPP that introduced most reforms, when the NDC could 
as easily have reached for cash transfers as a populist tactic before 2000 if it 
suspected this might avert electoral defeat. At least part of the answer is likely to 
lie in the international diffusion of ideas and the role of international agencies 
like the World Bank and bilateral aid agencies such as the UK’s DFID, which 
started more aggressively promoting cash transfers during the 2000s. Resource 
availability may also have played a role in that economic growth and revenue 
collection only really started increasing fiscal space from the 2000s onwards. 
Transnational political economy may therefore potentially have been as 
significant a factor as domestic electoral considerations. 
 
Several puzzles remain. Why was a universal social pension never seriously 
considered in Ghana – despite evidence of the breakdown of traditional kin 
support for the elderly (Apt, 2002; Aboderin, 2004)? And why did opposition to 
the LEAP cash transfer largely disappear?7 Were opponents simply appeased by 
its parsimonious and conditional nature, or had attitudes shifted substantially 
within the political policy elites? Why has the Kufuor administration’s 
preference for social insurance not proven more controversial, or any attempts 
made to expand social assistance to reach more of the poor (rather than the ultra-
poor)? Why was there no discussion of replacing the premium-bearing national 
health insurance with free healthcare services? Most importantly, Ghana’s social 
protection initiatives are widely seen as largely home-grown and government-
owned (Sultan & Schrofer, 2008), which would be exceptional on a continent 
where social protection has often been perceived as primarily a donor agenda, as 
has been the case in many of the other case studies conducted for the LIWPR 
research programme (see, for example, Grebe, 2014; Grebe & Mubiru, 2014; 
Seekings & Kabandula, 2015; Granvik, 2015).  
 
                                         
6 Although opposition to ‘handouts’, even within the NDC, had not entirely disappeared. See 
Grebe (2015). 
7 Informants involved in the initial proposal described strong political resistance (Interviews, 
Akusua Frema Osei-Opare, 31 October 2014; Ebenezer Jerry O. Odotei, 28 October 2014), 
but current managers of the programme describe strong support from their political principles 
(Interviews, Mawutor Ablo; Dzigbordi Kofi Agbekpornu, 12 November 2014). 
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One potential factor mediating the influence of electoral pressures on policy 
choices is that the NDC may have a majority of firmly-aligned and loyal core 
voters (Lindberg & Morrison, 2005: 574-575) – although this would need to be 
confirmed using more recent data – which would place stronger incentives on 
the NPP to enact popular (populist?) reforms in order to attract swing voters. In 
any event, both parties relied on swing voters to overturn previous electoral 
defeats, and if Lindberg & Morrison (2005: 577) are correct that although swing 
voters are not distinguished by structural characteristics (like age, gender, or 
class), they did “evaluate government performance as relatively ‘mature’ 
voters”, electoral pressure would tend to support policy reforms that are 
expected to appeal to a wide cross-section of the population. Furthermore, a 
growing proportion of Ghanaians of voting age report believing that voters 
should hold elected representatives accountable by ‘ensuring that they do their 
jobs’ (Armah-Attoh et al., 2014: 5), although only small minorities report 
engaging in collective action in order to raise concerns (Armah-Attoh & 
Robertson, 2014: 6). 
 
Table 1 shows presidential election results by region, with colour coding 
indicating which party’s candidate attracted most votes (NDC victories are 
indicated in orange and NPP victories in blue). The election results make clear 
that certain regions constitute “core support” for each party (Ashanti for the 
NPP, for example, and Volta as well as the Northern regions for the NDC). 
“Swing areas” – which include Greater Accra and Central, large population 




Table 1: Presidential election results: 1992-2012 
 
Region 1996 2000 2000 R/o 2004 2008 2008 R/o 2012 
Greater 
Accra 
Rawlings 54% Kuffour 53% Kuffour 60% Kuffour 52% A. Mills 52% 
A. 
Mills 54% Mahama 52% 








Addo 46% N. Addo 47% 
Ashanti 
Kuffour 66% Kuffour 75% Kuffour 81% Kuffour 77% N. Addo 73% 
N. 
Addo 74% N. Addo 71% 








Mills 26% Mahama 28% 
Eastern 
Rawlings 55% Kuffour 53% Kuffour 64% Kuffour 60% N. Addo 57% 
N. 
Addo 57% N. Addo 57% 








Mills 43% Mahama 42% 
Central 
Rawlings 55% Kuffour 50% Kuffour 60% Kuffour 59% A. Mills 51% 
A. 
Mills 54% Mahama 52% 








Addo 46% N. Addo 46% 
Western 
Rawlings 57% Kuffour 49% Kuffour 62% Kuffour 58% N. Addo 50% 
A. 
Mills 52% Mahama 54% 








Addo 48% N. Addo 44% 
Volta 








Mills 86% Mahama 85% 
Kuffour 5% Kuffour 8% Kuffour 11% Kuffour 14% N. Addo 15% 
N. 
Addo 14% N. Addo 13% 
Brong 
Ahafo 
Rawlings 62% Kuffour 51% Kuffour 60% Kuffour 52% N. Addo 51% 
A. 
Mills 51% Mahama 51% 








Addo 49% N. Addo 47% 








Mills 62% Mahama 58% 
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Kuffour 33% Kuffour 30% Kuffour 49% Kuffour 35% N. Addo 38% 
N. 
Addo 38% N. Addo 39% 
Upper 
East 








Mills 66% Mahama 66% 
Kuffour 17% Kuffour 19% Kuffour 42% Kuffour 32% N. Addo 35% 
N. 
Addo 34% N. Addo 29% 
Upper 
West 








Mills 62% Mahama 66% 
Kuffour 11% Kuffour 16% Kuffour 38% Kuffour 32% N. Addo 38% 
N. 
Addo 38% N. Addo 29% 
 
 
Resnick (2012; 2013) shows how the urban poor's political participation has 
become an increasingly important determinant of electoral outcomes in Africa. 
In particular, where opposition parties have employed 'populist strategies' for 
mobilising the urban poor, it has substantially increased their chances of 
unseating incumbents. At the same time, African elites have traditionally been 
seen as favouring urban dwellers over their rural counterparts (see, for example, 
Lipton, 1977, cited in Resnick, 2013), despite the latter until recently making up 
a very small proportion of the population in most African countries. The rise of 
interest in the urban poor as an important political constituency can be traced to 
several views, including that this is a group more prone to violence and unrest 
resulting from a sense of marginalisation and relative deprivation, and Resnick's 
view that the evidence suggests the poor in general, but the urban poor in 
particular, show higher levels of political participation in the form of voting than 
their non-poor and rural counterparts. 
 
All of this would suggest that in seeking electoral advantage, in a truly 
competitive democracy like Ghana, parties would face an incentive to adopt 
policies favouring the urban poor (in particular, opposition parties should benefit 
from appealing to urban poor voters through populist positions and mobilisation 
strategies; incumbents should face at least some incentive to seek to neutralise 
this force by appealing to the same constituency). The improvement of social 
insurance for those (mostly urban) citizens in formal employment and modest 
expansion of social assistance for the rural poor largely leaves out this urban 
poor constituency. On the other hand, incumbent governments are considered 
more able to appease the rural poor (Resnick, 2013), and LEAP could be seen as 
an ultimately unsuccessful strategy by the NPP to appease poor rural voters seen 
as more likely to vote NDC.  
 
The literature on other African democracies suggest that even in the absence of 
highly competitive elections, the key factors that determine whether electoral 
politics impacts on social policy are (1) the salience of the policy question as an 
electoral issue and (2) access to information on the issue – including sufficient 
information on parties and candidates’ (prospective) positions and 
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(retrospective) performance on the issue (see, for example, Stasavage, 2005; 
Harding & Stasavage, 2012).8 
 
A key question is therefore how salient social protection policies were as 
election issues in the critical elections of 2000, 2004, and 2008 (although the 
first of these may have been so over-determined by the two-decade dominance 
of Ghanaian politics by Jerry Rawlings as to render the impact of policy 
questions relatively insignificant). Further, whether media coverage and other 
factors allowed those voters for whom social protection was important enough 
that it might have impacted on their votes to acquire sufficient information (the 
performance of the current government and/or parties and candidates’ positions) 
for this to be the case. To get at this one needs to look at public opinion data and 
the conduct of actual election campaigns since 2000, i.e. how parties positioned 
themselves in order to appeal to voters, whether voters were likely to have been 
responsive to social protection ‘branding’ and ‘messaging’ and if so, in which 
way. Specifically, did social protection form a significant component of the 
platforms and political branding employed by either incumbent or opposition 
parties in the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections? The next two subsections begin to 
answer these questions, although a detailed and sophisticated analysis of public 




3.2 Public opinion on social and economic policy 
 
It is not possible to offer here an exhaustive analysis of the rich public opinion 
data available for Ghana from the six rounds of the Afrobarometer survey 
conducted in 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, and 2014. However, the data do 
provide useful insights into Ghanaians’ attitudes towards economic and social 
policy and provide some basis for understanding political party campaign 
strategies, and whether promised and/or delivered policies may have been 
designed to appeal to certain demographics, to be broadly popular, etc. and may 
therefore have been driven by electoral incentives. 
 
In 2008, before the elections, a majority of Ghanaians in the Afrobarometer 
sample expressed broad support for economic reform (agreeing that “in order for 
the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some 
hardships now”, with a substantial minority feeling that the costs of reform are 
                                         
8 Stasavage (2005: 53) argues, for example, that “the move to [Universal Primary Education 
in Uganda] has indeed been linked to democratic politics, and that this outcome has depended 




too high when asked to choose between two alternative statements). There is 
certainly not the consensus on market-oriented reform among the public that 
appears to exist among the political elite. A majority further agreed that the 
government’s economic policies had hurt most people, with a striking 40% 
agreeing “very strongly” that government’s economic policies “have hurt most 
people and only benefited a few”, when asked to choose between that and an 
alternative statement that economic policies have helped most people and only a 
few have suffered (CDD-Ghana, 2009: 7). This contrasts with 2005 (after re-
electing Kufuor as president), when a larger majority supported reform (64% in 
2005 vs 59% in 2008), although an even greater proportion then felt that 
economic policies had hurt most people – 67% in 2005 vs 54% in 2009 




Source: Afrobarometer, Rounds 3 and 4. 
 
 
This data seems somewhat paradoxical: Ghanaians appeared to support reform, 
accepting that short-term hardship would be necessary, but also felt that current 
economic policy was hurting the majority. In neither the 2005 nor the 2008 
Figure 1: Support for economic reforms and evaluations of 





rounds do the responses vary greatly between urban and rural respondents. 
Several other variables indicate a high level of economic dissatisfaction in both 
years. E Gyimah-Boadi and Mensah (2003: iv) interpret similar results from the 
earlier 2002 round as indicating “a deep ambivalence over market-centred 
economic reforms, reflected in strong support for state interventions that offset 
the expression of a lukewarm preference for a market economy”. These 
assessments of economic policy do not directly explain either the NPP’s election 
victories in 2000 and 2004 or its defeat in 2008. A more sophisticated analysis is 
necessary if we are to determine whether economic and living conditions were 
highly salient to voters in these elections, for example by exploring potential 
relationships between satisfaction with economic policy, assessments of 
government performance on various dimensions, perceptions of own living 
conditions, perceptions of future prospects, party affiliation, and voting 
intentions. The story is further complicated by what Gyimah-Boadi and Mensah 
(2003: xiii) described as a “power alternation bonus” in which willingness to 
endure hardships, political patience and trust in representatives had increased, 
despite deep economic dissatisfaction. This “bonus” may have worked in favour 
of the NPP in the 2004 elections. Nevertheless, the ‘lukewarm’ public support 
for market-oriented reform (among both urban and rural Ghanaians) may help to 







Source: Afrobarometer, Round 3 and 4. 
 
Nor is the election victory of the NDC in the 2008 elections easily explained by 
public opinion data on government performance. Evaluations of government 
performance in 2005 (shortly after the NPP was re-elected) and 2008 (shortly 
before they lost the election to the NDC) did not shift greatly on health and 
education. In 2008, 15% of respondents rated the NPP government’s 
performance on “improving basic health services,” poorly. 17% rated its 
performance in “addressing educational needs” poorly and 40% on “ensuring 
everyone has enough to eat. This was actually an improvement on the 2005 
ratings of health and education, when the respective figures were 25% and 27%, 
and only a slight worsening on food security ratings (38%). While this does not 
explain voting behaviour directly, the very favourable ratings on health and 
education policy may help explain why the NDC did not depart radically from 
the policy path (the capitation grant, school feeding, and national health 
insurance) initiated by the NPP government. As Table 2 shows, both these issues 
were highly salient, ranked as among the most serious problems facing the 
country. 
 
Figure 2: Evaluation of government performance on health, 





The, hypothesis that food security may have been a particularly salient issue for 
rural voters (many of whom rely on subsistence agriculture), and that the NPP 
could therefore have been harmed by the substantial minority who judged their 
performance as “fairly badly” or “very badly” is belied by the very small 
proportion of rural respondents who considered food shortages or agriculture the 
most important problems facing the country in 2008 (1% and 5% respectively). 
The salience of unemployment and poverty has been very high, with 
unemployment consistently rated as the most important problem facing the 
country by Afrobarometer respondents, in the surveys conducted in 2002 
(Gyimah-Boadi and Mensah, 2003), 2005 (Selormey et al., 2005) and 2008 
(CDD-Ghana, 2009). However, education and health are also consistently 
identified by a large proportion of respondents as among the three most 
 
Proportion of respondents ranking each issue as the first, second or third most important 
problem facing the country 
Issue 
2005 2008 2012 2014 








t First 28 17 22 31 20 25 24 17 
Second 16 8 12 15 11 13 13 10 
Third 7 5 6 8 9 9 10 7 
Top 











First 7 7 7 8 13 11 6 6 
Second 6 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 
Third 3 3 3 3 5 4 4 3 
Top 





n First 15 14 14 6 6 6 13 10 
Second 17 14 15 10 12 11 14 12 
Third 12 14 13 12 13 12 11 9 
Top 





First 4 4 4 3 2 2 4 3 
Second 9 10 10 6 4 5 9 8 
Third 13 14 14 10 12 11 13 10 
Top 
three 26 28 28 19 18 18 26 21 
Health and education 
top three 70 70 70 47 49 47 64 52 
 
Sources: Asunka et al. (2008: 27-28); Selormey et al. (2005: 34-36) 
Table 2: Salience of unemployment, poverty, health and education, 2005 and 




important problems facing the country, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 3. 
Neither poverty and destitution nor health was identified by more than 30% of 
Afrobarometer respondents as among the top three problems facing the country 
in the four rounds of the survey conducted between 2005 and 2014. It therefore 
seems unlikely that social protection (in the form of cash transfers or access to 
health insurance would have been a particularly salient electoral issue in any of 
the recent elections. It should be noted that unemployment and education were 
identified by a consistently large proportion of respondents as among the top 
three concerns. 
 
These results do not explain the outcomes of the elections, especially given the 
mysterious fact that weighted responses to the question “If a presidential 
election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for?” 
show a clear preference for the NPP in 2008 (45% compared to the NDC’s 
24%), although 37% of respondents indicated that they would not vote, didn’t 
know, or refused to answer the question. But the substantial salience of poverty, 
health, and education (at least as matters of public concern) – may point to 
substantial incentives on parties and candidates to be seen to be addressing 
poverty directly, and to expand access to education and healthcare. However, in 
the absence of data on the level of information available to the electorate, and 
the paradoxical results described above it is impossible to draw any strong 
conclusion. A more sophisticated analysis (such as multivariate regression 
models) would be needed to understand how public opinion on social protection 
may have influenced the outcome of the 2004 and 2008 elections, and how 





3.3. Election campaigns and political ‘branding’ 
 
Boafo-Arthur (2008: 33-36) attributes the NPP candidate’s victory during the 
run-off presidential election against Rawlings’ anointed successor, John Atta 
Mills, in 2000 to five primary factors: (1) the “arrogance and accompanying 
complacency” of the NDC, (2) the NDC’s lack of internal party democracy 
(which led to divisions and the formation of a breakaway party), (3) the 
economic hardship faced by Ghanaians, which ensured that a ‘sound economic 
management’ platform would resonate with the electorate, (4) the NPP’s well-
run campaign operation, and (5) the NPP’s success in portraying Mills as 
Rawlings’s puppet or “Rawlings [coming] to power through the back door.” The 
literature on the 2000 elections largely focuses on the momentous nature of the 
loss of power by the incumbent party, and the NPP’s successful campaign built 
on a platform of ‘sound economic management’ and ‘good governance.’ It does 
not appear that specific social protection issues featured prominently in the 
campaigns of either party. It would seem fair to conclude that the 2000 election 
might have been what is often referred to as a ‘referendum on the incumbent’ 
(Rawlings and an NDC dominated by the former), and consequently less issue-
based than subsequent elections. 
 
Figure 3: Salience of Unemployment, Poverty, Health and Education 
(among top-three concerns 2005-2014) 
	  
Source: Afrobarometer; Selormey, Asunka, and Armah-Attoh (2005: 34-36); Asunka, Armah-Attoh, and 




However, we should not be too quick to dismiss the role of social protection in 
the 2000 elections. Universal health coverage through a national health 
insurance scheme was an election pledge of the NPP, one which according to 
Agyepong and Adjei (2008) brought significant urgency to the party’s attempts 
to implement the NHIS before the 2004 elections. The content of election 
platforms and messaging will be addressed in greater detail below. 
 
Furthermore, and in line with Boafo-Arthur’s arguments, several analyses 
suggest that media coverage in the period leading up to the 2000 presidential 
and parliamentary elections played a crucial role in the NPP’s victory 
(Agyeman-Duah, 2000; Temin and Smith, 2002; Mensah, 2011),9 as well as a 
“skilful campaign fought by the [NPP],” which included messaging (particularly 
its slogan of ‘Positive Change’) that successfully appealed to particular groups, 
such as the youth (Nugent, 2001). Mensah argues on the basis of his interviews 
with party officials and a systematic analysis of media coverage that 
 
‘…the [NPP] needed to improve on its image as well as its vote gains 
in areas known to be strongholds of the opposition [in fact, at the time 
the incumbent NDC]. In these areas, the age-old perception amongst 
electors [was] that the NPP is a party that is tribal, elitist, anti-
migrants, and Christian-dominated. Thus, geographically five out of 
the ten regions in Ghana … were drawn as the battlegrounds by the 
NPP campaign. The objective in focusing on these regions was for the 
party to rid itself [of] the perceived sectarian image, in addition to 
gaining votes. 
 
…For example, in 1999 there was intense debate and rumours about 
the selection of vice-presidential candidates, particularly from the 
camp of the NPP due to its historic past as identified above. Since 
then, the selection of vice-candidates has become one of the pillars of 
electioneering strategy in Ghana, and one that has gained electoral 
traction in the news’ (Mensah, 2011: 193-194). 
 
Political ‘branding’ (i.e. of both parties and candidates) and the nature of 
election campaigns may therefore be crucial to the outcomes of elections in 
Ghana’s fourth republic, but crucially also for the evolution of social protection 
policy, especially if social policy featured significantly in the campaigns and the 
political salience of these issues were high enough to be deemed important 
electoral issues by politicians. Several case studies conducted as part of the 
‘Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms in Africa’ research 




programme have shown that ‘social protection brands’ featured prominently in 
recent elections in Botswana (Hamer, 2015b) and Malawi (Hamer, 2015a). 
 
On the other hand, Tweneboah-Koduah, Akotia, Akotia, and Hinson (2010: 87) 
conclude that “political parties in Ghana are not managed as brands … [nor] do 
they constitute mental [or] emotional effects [sic] akin to strong consumer 
brands.” They are however, writing from a commercial brand management 
perspective, and while one should take note if their findings, this does not 
invalidate a ‘political branding’ perspective on the behaviour of politicians and 
parties in Ghana. One must nevertheless be careful in analysing campaign 
activities, since non-media-visible aspects and a range of non-branding 
dynamics may have played a significant role in how election campaigns have 
impacted on voters, and on politicians’ calculations about how policy positions 
may be received by the electorate.  
 
There is also evidence of direct patronage (effectively ‘vote-buying’) by 
parliamentary candidates in constituency-level electioneering (Lindberg, 2003). 
Furthermore, despite a proliferation in private media outlets after the repeal 
(shortly before the 1992 elections) of the Newspaper Licensing Law (which 
required publication licences from the Secretary of Information) in force under 
the NDPC regime (Temin & Smith, 2002: 588), the largest newspapers 
remained state-owned. The main state-owned newspapers were reported to have 
shown “considerable bias in favour of the NDC and its allies in the Progressive 
Alliance” during the 1992 elections (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994: 79). It should be 
noted, however that Temin & Smith (2002: 587) temper their conclusions on the 
basis of public opinion survey data, which show vast discrepancies in media 
consumption: “just as they are virtually omnipresent in Ghana’s more urbanised 
areas, the mass media are largely absent in more rural and remote parts, where 
many Ghanaians have very limited access to media outlets.” 
 
This suggests that even with a high degree of electoral salience of social 
protection issues (of which there is no direct evidence – the public opinion data 
cited earlier merely shows that the issues which social protection schemes may 
be used to address are of substantial concern to the public), lack of access to 
information may render the electoral impact lower than expected. This appears 
to be particularly true of rural populations (Stasavage, 2005). 
 
Social protection policies do not appear to have enjoyed great prominence 
during recent elections, nor does the public opinion data suggest that the 2004 or 
2008 elections were won or lost on performance in social policy. In fact, a naïve 
review of the public opinion data does not sit well with the analysis of Lindberg 
and Morrison (2005) that issue-based voting by ‘swing voters’ determined the 
election outcomes. Coupled with the overriding salience of ‘unemployment’ as 
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the chief concern and favourable ratings of the NPP government’s performance 
in health and education, it seems unlikely that the 2000, 2004, or 2008 elections 
were substantially influenced by ‘social protection brands’.  
 
While, in the 2000 elections, the NPP felt the need to shed its image of being 
elite-based, ethnic, and that Kufuor himself attempted to project a concern for 
the welfare of the poor (Nugent, 2001), according to Hinson and Tweneboah-
Koduah (2010), the party failed to communicate with the ‘grassroots electorate’ 
during the 2008 campaign (for example, by not communicating in local 
languages) and instead projected an image of aloofness. Despite a sophisticated 
campaign operation, it trumpeted its successes in macroeconomic management 
in ways that did not resonate with ordinary Ghanaians, but not its successes in 
social policy: 
 
‘As far as integrated marketing communications is concerned, the 
NPP ran one of the most impressive ever in Ghana’s political history. 
However, it was all style without substance. The process adopted 
placed too much emphasis on style with little or no emphasis on 
substance. The NPP failed to communicate the several social 
interventions, NHIS, Free Bus Ride, School Feeding Programme, and 
Free Maternal Care it had initiated, and went on about microeconomic 
indicators that ordinary Ghanaians cared little about’ (Hinson & 
Tweneboah-Koduah, 2010: 208). 
 
Perhaps some lessons were learnt from the 2008 failure. The social protection 
reforms pursued by the NPP administrations between 2000 and 2008 were 
prominently trumpeted as achievements in their 2012 election manifesto’s 
preamble, and the document expressed support for continuing and expanding 
these schemes. But it was still not a ‘front and centre’ theme in their election 
material: 
 
‘The NPP has a proud history of providing value and comfort to the 
Ghanaian people. Legislation and policies introduced under the 
Kufuor administration include providing free Compulsory Basic 
Education, the National Health Insurance Scheme, the Metro Mass 
Transport, Micro and Small Loans Centre and the Livelihood 
Empowerment and Advancement Programme (LEAP). We promoted 
good governance and democracy by strengthening our institutions of 
governance. 
 
Our pensioners hold a special place in our country, having served 
many years in contributing to national development in various 
capacities. Many of our pensioners and the aged fall into the category 
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of LEAP beneficiaries. We will revive the social protection 
programmes that the NDC has allowed to deteriorate and restore them 
from a depressed, inactive state. … We will popularise and promote 
the tier three provisions of the new Pensions Act, 2008, Act 766 to 
enhance the value of the pensions for our elderly’ (NPP, 2012). 
 
There was very little academic literature available on the 2012 campaign at the 
time of writing, and it was hard to tell whether a concerted effort was made by 
the NPP to employ social protection policy in the election campaign. What was 
clear is that neither party has promised either a universal social pension or 
substantial fiscal commitment to LEAP as a populist electoral strategy. If social 
protection enjoyed at least some salience – public opinion data suggests that 
unemployment (partially addressed through public works), education, healthcare 
and similar issues were important to the voting public and may have influenced 
their electoral choices - why did the NDC not adopt a populist social protection 
platform, either one that painted the Kufuor administration’s reforms to the 
contributory system as inequitable or one that promised massive expansion of 
social assistance. The former may have appealed to the urban poor and second to 
their rural base. The puzzle as to why the urban poor constituency (so important 
in Resnick’s analysis) is ‘left out’ of Ghana’s welfare regime remains unsolved. 
This may be explained in part, if it in fact remained the case in 2008 and 2012, 
that swing voters did not share any specific structural similarities and therefore 
did not constitute a cohesive bloc to which parties could attempt to appeal with 
populist strategies. 
 
On the basis of the available information it is not possible to conclude whether 
such a strategy would have stood much chance of success, and it may well be 
that the electoral salience of and information availability on social protection 
was simply too low to create a strong incentive for party elites to radically alter 
course. Although national health insurance had been a key election pledge in 
2000, and a desire to deliver on this election promise in time for the 2004 
election appears to have given substantial impetus to early implementation, there 
is scant evidence of electoral dynamics having been a major driver of social 
protection reform in Ghana. This question requires further research for any 
conclusive answer to be possible. 
 
 
4. Actors and reform agendas under NPP and 
NDC governments 
 
The previous section dealt mainly with the actions of politicians, responding to 
electoral incentives (or the perceived electoral advantages and disadvantages of 
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particular policy positions and enacting reforms), as well as the ‘social 
protection branding’ employed in election campaigns. But when it comes to the 
actual policy-making process, a number of other sets of actors become 
important, most critically bureaucrats and donors. These actors have divergent 
interests and agendas, which can (and have, in the case of Ghana) important 
implications for the formulation and implementation of reforms. In order to 
understand the shape of the reforms, it is helpful to think about the interests and 
agendas of these actors. Devereux and White (2010), distinguish between 
‘technocratic’, ‘ideological’ and ‘political’ agendas. The latter can largely be 
equated with ‘electoral agendas’, although the way in which parties and 
candidates position themselves with respect to social protection policy is of 
course influenced by ideology, and not the product of naked electoral 
calculation.  
 
In this section the main focus will therefore be on the interplay between 
‘technocratic agendas’ among bureaucrats and transnational actors, and 
‘ideological’ as well as ‘political’ agendas among the politicians who ultimately 
decide which reforms are legislatively enacted, and which (as well as to what 
extent) programmes are funded. But structural factors, such as the power and 
autonomy of bureaucrats vis-à-vis their political principals and donor influence 
are equally important. An attempt is made to analyse this complex interplay in 
order to help explain the policy reform path in Ghana since 2000. 
 
Agyepong and Adjei (2008), in their analysis of Ghana’s healthcare financing 
reforms during the first term of the Kufuor/NPP government, cite Grindle and 
Thomas (1991), who offer a useful typology of actors in policy reform 
processes: 
 
‘Successful public policies and programs are rare because it is unusual 
to have progressive and committed politicians and bureaucrats (saints) 
supported by appropriate policy analysts with available and reliable 
information (wizards) that manage hostile and apathetic groups 
(demons) and consequently insulate the policy environment from the 
vagaries of implementation (systems).’ 
 
While this terminology is not adopted in this paper, it is worth keeping in mind 
that the ‘bureaucracy’ referred to is not a monolithic entity. As research in 
Uganda has shown, disagreements and contestation over policy within the 






4.1 Who drove the reform agenda? 
 
Informants differ in their assessment of the relative impact of bureaucrats (or a 
‘technocratic agenda’) and political and ideological agenda in driving welfare 
reforms in Ghana. Predictably, senior bureaucrats claimed that ideas were 
generated within the bureaucracy, whilst politicians claim that ‘political vision’ 
was what was required in order to inspire a lethargic civil service. When asked 
about the obstacles to implementation of social security reforms, former 
President Kufuor cites the bureaucracy first (rather than the political opposition, 
more conservative opponents within his party, or even fiscal constraints): 
 
‘I found the bureaucracy to be quite lethargic. They weren’t resisting 
out of, say, ideology. The civil servants, at least at that time, tended to 
be passive. They needed political leadership to do … what the [we] 
had as a vision and wanted to implement, in terms of getting the laws, 
etc. So it wasn’t active resistance against the new administration, it 
was just that the bureaucracy [needed] a driver with vision and to 
activate it.’ 
 
This view was not shared by bureaucrats interviewed for this research. In fact, 
they generally paint a picture of a professional bureaucracy pushing ‘good 
policy,’ and at the mercy of the constraints imposed by politics. Senior 
bureaucrats understood that whether their proposals would be adopted depended 
on political support and give credit to politicians who bought into their 
‘technocratic agenda’ on social protection.10 
 
When one reviews the history of policy proposals with respect to pension 
reform, health insurance, and cash transfers, a rather complex picture emerges, 
in which donors also played a significant role. While the available data from 
public documents is limited, instructive examples can be found, for example the 
participation of donors in the informal ‘Social Vulnerability Group’ assembled 
by the then-Ministry of Manpower Youth and Employment to draft the National 
Social Protection Strategy in 2007,11 and donors’ increasing involvement in 
LEAP – both as funders and in providing technical assistance (see Grebe, 2015). 
 
Interviews with former President John Kufuor and Dr Anthony Akoto-Osei (his 
advisor who was tasked with driving the pension reforms and who later became 
deputy Finance Minister) primarily reflected a discourse of assistance to the 
destitute, but a vision of self-sufficiency and productive activity, in which most 
Ghanaians would eventually have the ability and opportunity to insure 
                                         
10 Interview, Mawutor Ablo (12 November 2014). 
11 Interview, Akusua Frema Osei-Opare (31 October 2014). 
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themselves against the risks of old age, disability and health. It therefore 
appeared to reflect an ideological agenda characterised by a developmental 
vision in which a social insurance system would become viable for a growing 
proportion of the population as they entered productive work, incomes rose, and 
their ability to join contributory schemes increased. This was further reflected in 
the primary focus on contributory social insurance, both in the information 
volunteered during the interviews12 and in the actual policy reforms pursued 
during the NPP’s period in power. LEAP did not form a central part of this 
agenda, but was rather something seen as necessary, in the interim, as a response 
to extreme poverty under underdevelopment in the countryside.  
 
An ideological agenda that saw social assistance as a ‘temporary’ buffer against 
the shocks of economic reforms, including fuel subsidy reductions, would also 
help explain the relatively parsimonious nature of the LEAP scheme. Of course, 
one cannot rule out that an electoral/political agenda existed in which LEAP 
featured as a political expedient, particularly in the light of its introduction 
shortly before the 2008 elections. (Similarly, the ‘capitation grant’ was 
introduced shortly before the 2004 elections.) But, as shown in the previous 
section, the evidence for such a conclusion is thin. 
 
The ideological agenda revealed in interviews with Kufuor and his close 
associates13 stands in contrast with a technocratic agenda, which saw social 
assistance (and cash transfers in particular) as an effective tool to address 
extreme poverty, which existed both among sections of the domestic 
bureaucracy14 and reflected a ‘transnational poverty agenda’ which had 
significant influence over development discourse in the later 1990s and 2000s. 
 
When asked directly about the choice of social security reforms introduced by 
the NPP administration, President Kufuor refers to his free-market-oriented 
economic philosophy. This may help explain why social insurance was such a 
major component of the reforms pursued by his administration, although he also 
suggests that social assistance is necessary for the poorest most vulnerable 
households that ‘slip through the net’: 
 
‘Empowerment, to put ‘meat’ into citizenship. … Empower the people 
with these policies, so that you give them the opportunity to become 
truly equal within the polity. … We did not do it for socialism. I do 
not believe in state control, I do not subscribe to that. … But market 
                                         
12 Interviews, John A. Kufuor (6 November 2014) and Anthony Akoto Osei (5 November 
2014). 
13 Interviews, John A. Kufuor (6 November 2014); Anthony Akoto Osei (5 November 2014) 
and Prof Baffour Agyeman-Duah (31 October 2014). 
14 Interview, Ebenezer Jerry O. Odotei (28 October 2014). 
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with a conscience, of course. Then the individual should be strong 
enough to do things. So this is why those policies were selected’ 
(Interview, John A. Kufuor, 6 November 2014). 
 
Social assistance and direct income transfers to the poor do seem, as claimed by 
some respondents, primarily to have resulted from the successful pursuit of a 
technocratic agenda. This agenda was driven to a certain extent by bureaucrats 
within the national development planning apparatus, who had become aware of 
the limited impact of existing policies on families in extreme poverty, and also 
by an increasingly strong donor agenda and policy/idea diffusion from a 
transnational development discourse in which social protection (in which social 
assistance and specifically cash transfers) had become increasingly central to the 
poverty reduction agenda during the 2000s.  
 
It is also probable that the PRSP process and Millennium Development Goals 
increased the pressure on the Ghanaian state to demonstrate (in the transnational 
domain) concrete progress in reducing poverty. Cash transfers may have seemed 
like a reasonable way to achieve relatively quick progress, accounting in part for 
the willingness of political leaders (most especially President Kufuor) to 
entertain these proposals, despite cash transfers not naturally forming a 
component of their political vision, as well as worries over a backlash against 
‘handouts’. While the Brazilian example with conditional cash transfers may 
have contributed to an openness to the idea, LEAP was not a direct emulation of 
Bolsa Familia (or the result of the relationship between Lula and Kufuor, as 
claimed by Akoto Osei), since it was vastly less ambitious in terms of fiscal 
commitment, benefit levels, and the number of beneficiaries it was intended to 
reach. 
 
On balance, it seems reasonable to conclude that an ‘ideological agenda’ was the 
primary driver of contributory social security reform and a ‘technocratic agenda’ 
was the primary driver of social assistance expansion during this period – 
although the reality of policy-making is necessarily less neat and clear than this 
rather simplistic formulation would suggest. (For example, politicians like 
Frema Osei-Opare were important figures with an ideological commitment to 
social assistance within the political elite, and some technocrats were 







4.2 Bureaucrats and politicians: managing and 
implementing reforms 
 
It appears that a strong technocratic agenda existed to improve health-sector 
performance, which gained substantial political momentum through the NPP 
government’s strong desire to see reforms promised before the 2000 election 
enacted before the 2004 elections. According to Agyepong and Adjei (2008), 
bureaucrats saw this sense of political urgency around a major policy platform 
as an opportunity to bring about reforms that would not otherwise be viable. 
However, they were hampered by political naiveté: 
 
‘[Bureaucrats] were aware of the technical issues, difficulties and 
challenges of developing and implementing a viable NHIS. It appears, 
however, that they were slower to fully discern the political concerns, 
climate, influences and policy characteristics, their importance, and 
how to create appropriate space to manoeuvre to steer policy in the 
desired technical direction within them’ (Agyepong & Adjei, 2008: 
158). 
 
Interviews with bureaucrats responsible for the implementation of the LEAP 
programme (from the national director of social protection, down to village 
level) created the impression of a genuine commitment to ‘client service’ with 
respect to beneficiaries and a desire for professional management of 
programmes free from political interference.15 National-level bureaucrats, 
including those in national agencies responsible for the regulation of the new 
‘three tier’ pension system (the NPRA)16 and implementation of the NHIS (the 
NHIA),17 seemed to enjoy a significant degree of autonomy and professionalism. 
In an entirely different context, Crook and Ayee (2006) found a similarly 
‘positive organisational culture’ among ‘street level bureaucrats’ in Ghana, 
although it “was not sufficient to cope with the negative impact of politically 
protected privatisations,” indicating that political interference remains a problem 
for bureaucrats in Ghana. The programme manager of LEAP (and director of the 
LEAP implementation unit) said: 
 
‘It appears that Ghanaian social protection bureaucrats had a relatively 
high degree autonomy from their political masters, at least by the 
2000s, both in terms of agenda-setting powers and professional 
                                         
15 Interviews, William Niyuni (10 November 2014); Robert Austin (11 November 2014); 
Mawutor Ablo (12 November 2014); Dzigbordi Kofi Agbekpornu (12 November 2014); 
Musah Abdul-Majeed (15 November 2014); Zulai Alhassan (17 November 2014). 
16 Interview, Ernest Amertey-Vondee (12 November 2014). 
17 Interview, O.B. Ocheampong (21 November 2014). 
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management of programmes, although programmes are not entirely 
insulated from ‘clientelistic’ manipulation. Abdulai (2014a), for 
example finds clear evidence of educational resources being 
disproportionally allocated along neopatrimonialist lines under both 
NPP and NDC governments.’ 
 
In the companion paper describing Ghana’s social protection policy reform 
process (Grebe, 2015), reference was made to both disappointing impacts of the 
LEAP programme as revealed in a formal impact evaluation (see Handa et al., 
2014) and operational problems, such as the late payment of transfers (Park, 
Handa et al., 2012),18 that had beset the programme. There is clear evidence of a 
desire among bureaucrats to improve efficiencies and the standard of the 
programme’s operational management, and a willingness to draw extensively on 
technical support from donors. The LEAP programme manager19 describes 
substantial efforts – supported by donors – to strengthen the operational capacity 
of the unit: 
 
‘Just before I came in, DFID recruited some technical assistance, 
based in their office. … Finance technical assistance, a cash payments 
specialist, an M&E [monitoring and evaluation] specialist and the 
Honourable Minister brought me on board to complement their 
programme to manage the programme very professionally. … So that 
we look at our beneficiaries as customers, and make sure they receive 
all the customer service … so that is how we are trying to drive the 
programme. … In terms of human resources, we are currently running 
a very lean team. I’ve just initiated a World Bank process to recruit 
additional staff to help boost the programme. … We have just 
completed a process of improving case management and grievance 
procedures with technical assistance from UNICEF.’ (Interview, 
Dzigbordi Kofi Agbekpornu, 12 November 2014). 
 
There appears to be a clear shared ‘technocratic agenda’ between social 
development bureaucrats and donor agencies, not only in favour of cash 
transfers, but also to ensure that the LEAP cash transfer is successful. However, 
the programme’s success depends not only on its successful management, but 
                                         
18 These problems were also described to the author by beneficiaries interviewed in November 
2014 and by officials with operational responsibility, although all were keen to emphasise 
recent improvements in the regularity of payments and other operational matters (Interviews, 
William Niyuni, 10 November 2014; Musah Abdul-Majeed, 15 November 2014). 
19 Dzigbordi Kofi Agbekpornu, an accountant and experienced manager, had recently 
assumed this position at the time of the fieldwork, having been recruited from the private 
sector with the express purpose of improving the professionalism and efficiency of the LEAP 
implementation unit within the Department of Social Welfare. 
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the political commitment to it, and the willingness of the government to commit 
resources to the programme. Informants generally described a high level of 
political commitment to the cash transfer scheme, although this commitment is 
called into question by the actual resources devoted to it. 
 
When asked why Ghanaian political leaders appeared supportive of cash 
transfers, compared to political elites in many Sub-Saharan African countries 
where strong resistance to ‘handouts’ have been observed (see, for example, 
Grebe, 2014; Grebe & Mubiru, 2014), the Director of Social Protection alludes 
to an alignment between ‘technocratic’ and ‘ideological’ agendas: 
 
‘We don’t have that problem. The political leadership has so much 
concern for [the poor]. So that if there’s a program that will support 
them… what will it be? … There was a lady [Frema Osei-Opare, 
Deputy Minister at the time of LEAP’s design]. [She and other 
members of the committee] were more or less technocrats, but they 
were also a politicians. They had been in the development field. … So 
she really understood, and we did not have any problems, the 
programme was initiated. Now, when the political leadership changed 
[in 2008], we still did not have any problem. Because the incoming 
government was a social democratic government. They saw this 
programme as compatible with social democracy. They embraced it. 
They even enhanced it. For instance, the level of benefits was 
increased, a new targeting mechanism was introduced to enhance the 




4.3 Elite politics and reform 
 
The arguments made so far do not yet capture the complex dynamics of 
Ghanaian politics in the post-democratisation period – and by focusing on the 
relevant ‘agendas’ merely hint at some of the driving forces of distributional 
outcomes. For example, Abdulai & Hickey (2014: 1) argue that resource 
allocation in Ghana’s education sector during the period 1993-2008 were 
“closely shaped by the incentives and norms generated by Ghana’s competitive 
‘clientelistic political settlement’, which overrode rhetorical concerns with 
national unity and inclusive development.”  
 
As mentioned earlier, attempts have been made to move beyond a simple 
dichotomy of democratic political dimensions (electoral incentives, including 
voter behaviour and attempts to appeal to core and swing voters) and 
‘clientelistic’ or ‘neopatrimonial’ dimensions in African politics. Abdulai and 
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Hickey (2014: 2) frame their analysis as a critique of previous attempts to 
identify broad correlations between distributional outcomes (specifically 
spending patterns) and voting patterns, that seek to analyse how democratic 
procedures and ‘neopatrimonial’ forms of politics combine in complex ways. 
These have largely focused on ways in which electoral politics generate 
incentives, for example on incumbents to direct public resources on the basis of 
maximising voter support, either by disproportionately benefitting areas of core 
voter support or to appeal to swing voters. These aspects were discussed above. 
Abdulai and Hickey attempt to offer a more sophisticated analysis of the 
dynamics at work, by focusing on complex elite behaviour and elite-popular 
dynamics though a ‘political settlements’ approach (see, for example, Khan, 
2010; 2011a; 2011b; Laws, 2010). Their application of the political settlements 
approach includes consideration of the ‘holding power’ of different factions 
within ruling coalitions. 
 
Several authors have argued that Ghana’s political settlement and political 
dynamics have impeded structural economic transformation (Whitfield, 2011; 
Oduro et al., 2014), including the failure to close the development and poverty 
gulf between Northern and Southern regions of Ghana (Abdulai, 2014a; 2014b; 
Abdulai & Hulme, 2014). For example, Abdulai (2014a) analyses systematic 
disproportional resource allocations in the education sector, broadly favouring 
the South in under both NDC and NPP governments, but with varying specific 
‘clientelistic’ use of public resources. He links this to the representation, and 
consequent agenda-setting powers, of regional politicians within ruling 
coalitions, and specifically distinguishes this factor from voting behaviour: 
 
‘…the findings here also suggest the need to rethink the prevailing 
perception that the politics of resource sharing in Africa is shaped 
fundamentally by the voting patterns of different ethnic groups and 
regions. Although the three poorer northern regions are widely known 
to be the electoral strongholds of the NDC along with Volta, we have 
seen that none of the Northern regions enjoyed the level of per child 
educational spending like Volta during the Rawlings-led NDC 
governments in the 1990s. Moreover, while one would have expected 
the NPP political elites to direct substantial educational expenditures 
to the North so as to court votes from opposition strongholds, in 
reality this did not happen… 
 
… the weaker representation of northern politicians and their 
corresponding lack of agenda-setting powers within these ruling 
coalitions (even if to varying degrees) implied that even social 
protection programmes designed with the aim of specifically targeting 
the poorer localities ended up marginalising the poorer northern 
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regions at the level of implementation. It is this relationship between 
the regional distribution of political power at the level of elites and the 
distribution of public goods at the mass level that also helps explain 
why the Volta region could so easily transform from being one of the 




5. Conclusion: Ghanaian political dynamics 
and social protection policy reform 
 
A number of inter-related analytical approaches have been applied to Ghanaian 
politics in an attempt to help explain the nature and timing of the significant 
social protection reforms that have been undertaken since 2000. These include 
reflections on the nature of electoral incentives and voter behaviour, public 
opinion and ‘political branding’ with respect to social protection, as well as an 
analysis of ‘actors’ and ‘agendas’ in the policy reform process. However, neat 
answers were not produced. It is probably safe to conclude that the ideological 
orientation of the New Patriotic Party and former President Kufuor played a 
significant role in driving contributory social insurance reforms. Furthermore, it 
seems that the transnational ‘poverty reduction agenda’ of the 1990s and 2000s 
(which found its most prominent expression in the PRSP process linked to debt 
relief for highly indebted poor countries and the Millennium Development 
Goals) combined with a domestic ‘technocratic agenda’ to provide impetus to 
the introduction of pro-poor social policies (most prominently free primary 
education and a large school feeding programme) and a limited cash transfer 
programme.  
 
However, the role of electoral incentives is much less clear. For example, the 
electoral salience of social protection is hard to determine, and it appears that 
neither major political party judged it electorally useful to adopt a strongly 
populist position and try to court poor rural voters with the promise of 
substantial expansion of social assistance (for example, by using a large 
expansion of LEAP as an electoral promise). In order to explain this, one may 
need to turn not to voting patterns, but rather the nature and composition of the 
‘ruling coalitions’ (under the governments of both major parties), including elite 
bargains and relative agenda-setting powers, as is emphasised in the so-called 
‘political settlements’ framework. However, a puzzle remains, even if one 
accepts that Southerners dominate the political elite – across both major parties 
– and that anomalous (and therefore presumably clientelistic resource allocation) 
cannot be explained by a simplistic analysis assuming either the reward of core 
supporters, or attempts to appeal to swing voters or voters in opposition-voting 
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constituencies where members of the incumbent party calculate they may be 
able to woo opposition voters through the distribution of state resource. In such 
circumstances, where Southerners dominate the political elite and have 
disproportional agenda-setting powers, one might expect poverty targeting of 
social assistance programmes to be controversial. It has indeed proven to be the 
case in other settings, where ‘universal’ benefits such as a non-means-tested 
social pension (which tends to disproportionally benefit the better off) have been 
preferred – because this would channel a greater proportion of the resources 
allocated to poverty reduction programmes to wealthier districts than would 
(even imperfectly or politically-manipulated) poverty-targeted programmes.  
 
Indeed, this dynamic may form part of a plausible explanation for the preference 
that has been shown among Ghanaian policy-makers for contributory social 
security schemes – as these would, by design and by definition, benefit the 
better-off. Yet it would not channel resources towards the poor who live in 
Southern (wealthier districts) as would social assistance programmes that were 
less poverty targeted – especially given that poverty targeting in Ghana has 
generally involved geographical targeting (identifying the poorest districts and 
rolling out programmes there first) in addition to household-level targeting. 
Countervailing forces certainly may include the ideological preference for 
parsimonious and highly selective programmes (as LEAP has proven to be), and 
the almost complete absence of a ‘rights-based’ discourse around social 
protection among the political elite, as well as the strong influence of the 
‘technocratic agenda’, which favours poverty-targeting as a technical 
mechanism to maximise impact. Yet it remains surprising – and unexplained – 
that universal or ‘categorical’ social assistance programmes have not featured 
prominently on the poverty agenda in Ghana. 
 
In order to answer these complex unanswered questions, a more sophisticated 
analysis of the impact of Ghana’s complex political dynamics on social 
protection policy-making would be necessary than has been achieved in this 
paper. But it would likely have to incorporate rhetorical/ideological agendas and 
individual leaders’ agency, the structural power and autonomy of Ghanaian 
bureaucracy, the role of transnational actors (donors and development agencies) 
– which impacts on the power technocratic agendas, as well as both electoral 
incentives in Ghana’s highly competitive democracy and the complex elite 
dynamics that help shape party politics. The web of power relations and 
incentives at work in Ghana’s ‘Fourth Republic’ would not be easy to 
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